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JUDGES, LAWYERS AND THE
PENALTY OF DEATH
Michael E. Tigar*
The judicial selection controversy again raises the question of the
role judges should play in defending countermajoritarian principles.
Eighteen years ago, I addressed an aspect of the problem in my answer to
Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch.' There, I tried to set
out a theory of Article III federal judging in the context of foreign rela-
tions and military policy.
Here, I want to pick up only one strand of the debate: I want to talk
about death. The electoral fate of Chief Justice Rose Bird of California
had much to do with the death penalty,' and it leads us to consider a
judge's obligations.
Today in the Fifth Circuit, a judicial debate rages that is ostensibly
about death and lawyers, but will surely influence the judicial selection
process, especially if the practice of seeking specific commitments on ide-
ological issues from judicial nominees continues.
It is time to restate what judging should be about under a constitu-
tion containing fundamental guarantees of minority rights. Only when
we have addressed this issue can we intelligently ask what kind of system
will produce judges who can discharge their obligations. Judging in such
a system surely requires a firm commitment to defense of individual and
group rights against the state's power. But there is more. Judges must
be both willing and free to build a space within which claims for justice
may be argued and determined, always contentiously and often tenden-
tiously. Judicial freedom to build such a space can only be guaranteed by
selection systems that are designed to insulate judges from political
pressures.
* The author is the Chairman-Elect of the American Bar Association Section of Litiga-
tion and the Joseph D. Jamail Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas. These remarks
were delivered at a Symposium sponsored by The National Judicial College and the University
of Texas School of Law on December 3, 1988. This address is reprinted with the permission of
the Capital Report, NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION DEATH PENALTY
LITIGATION SECTION.
1. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine" and Foreign Relations, 17
UCLA L. REv. 1135 (1970), reprinted in 3 VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R.
Falk ed. 1971) (discussing A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962)).
2. See, e.g., Galante, California Justices Face Own Executions, 9 Nat'l L. J., Nov. 3, 1986,
at 1, col. 1.
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Judicial willingness is another matter. Honest selection processes
and structural guarantees of independence can only create the precondi-
tions of countermajoritarian judging; they cannot inoculate the judges
against "robe fever."
The death penalty cases now undergoing federal collateral review in
the Fifth Circuit provide an object lesson. In a recent case, a three-judge
panel of the Fifth Circuit denied a motion for certificate of probable
cause and a motion for stay of execution.3 Judge Edith Jones wrote these
words in a special concurring opinion: "The veil of civility that must
protect us in society has been twice torn here. It was rent wantonly when
[the defendant] robbed, raped and murdered [his victims]. It has again
been torn by [defense] counsel's conduct, inexcusable according to ordi-
nary standards of law practice."4
The lawyer in this case was a volunteer from New York, one of
hundreds who have answered the call of federal judges and the organized
bar to take capital cases. The judge's condemnation of defense counsel's
conduct was made without giving him any opportunity to respond.
When I looked into it, I found that he seemed to be guilty, at most, of
some delay in getting papers filed when the stay of execution he had ear-
lier obtained was automatically vacated as the result of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Lynaugh.5
Judge Jones went on in her opinion to say:
I would advocate considering the imposition of sanctions in
cases such as this. At a minimum, I would suggest that counsel
who have engaged in delaying tactics should be struck from the
rolls of the Fifth Circuit and not be allowed to practice in our
court for a period of years.6
Similar language, though less harsh, appeared in a recent opinion by
Judges Gee and Davis.7 Their condemnation of counsel rested on their
"assumption" that delay was the result of deliberate misconduct rather
than the pressure under which the volunteer small-firm counsel was
laboring.'
If Judge Jones' remarks come to reflect the Fifth Circuit's view, how
can we ask lawyers to devote themselves to these gut-wrenching cases?
3. Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1988).
4. Id. at 985-86.
5. 108 S. Ct. 2320, on remand, 860 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1988).
6. Bell, 858 F.2d at 986.
7. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 860 F.2d 165, 166 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (defense counsel
sought habeas corpus relief sixty hours prior to defendant's scheduled execution).
8. Id.
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How can we expect them to spend thousands of uncompensated hours of
time and thousands of dollars in expenses, when their vigorous and asser-
tive efforts to spare their clients' lives will be met with hyperbolic con-
demnation in the Federal Reporter and threats to undermine their
livelihoods by barring them from practice in the court of appeal?
The lawyer censured by Judge Jones may have been guilty of incon-
veniencing his adversary and judges. However, he did nothing more seri-
ous than one sees in litigation at all levels of the system, and which, in
most cases, merits only the mildest of rebukes, if any.
Broader concerns compel us here. We must expect-I would even
say hope-that death cases will inspire commitment proportional to the
stakes involved. Saving lives from the hangman's noose has inspired
some of our profession's proudest hours.
Moreover, the federal courts have taught us that any issue not raised
at the earliest possible hour may be waived.9 Inevitably, this leads to a
proliferation of argued points, a tactic at odds with the more common
practice of selecting only those arguments perceived as strongest. All
lawyers and judges now know that Justices of the Supreme Court have
often granted stays when the Fifth Circuit has summarily refused them,10
a fact that ought to make judges a little more tolerant of these multi-
claim petitions.
Finally, the reinstitution of death sentences in large numbers has
brought an expected and salutary consequence: a re-examination of the
process of investigation and trial to see if it will ever be fair, decent, and
reliable enough to permit us to kill people based on its results. In ap-
proximately half of the cases, federal review finds defects in state proce-
dures." Additionally, the federal-collateral-review counsel is often the
first to make a thorough review of the constitutional issues in the record.
The high-stakes process of rearranging fundamental values demands
two kinds of participants: advocates who are willing to be courageous,
selfless, tireless, diligent and eloquent enough to bear the battle; and,
9. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1979); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977).
10. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 569 (1988) (Fifth Circuit denied stay in
Hawkins v. Lynaugh, 862 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1988)); Bell v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 254 (1988)
(Fifth Circuit denied stay in Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1988)); Bridge v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 20 (5th Cir. 1988) (Fifth Circuit denied stay in Bridge v. Lynaugh, 838
F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1988)); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987) (Fifth Circuit denied
stay in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1987)).
11. Von Drehle, Capital Punishment in Paralysis, Miami Herald, July 10, 1988, at IA, col.
1. See generally Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987).
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judges who are willing to have the tolerance, patience, wisdom, and-
yes-humility to understand the demands of the system their predeces-
sors built and in which we now live.
I hope I am not misunderstood. I raise this issue to make a propo-
sal: the judges of the circuit should begin an earnest discussion with the
lawyers of the circuit-and with the bar groups who help to recruit vol-
unteer lawyers-to address these concerns.
In the days of Fortescue's De Laudibus,12 when judges came from
the ranks of lawyers and continued to meet and dine together, there was
less risk that either would forget their mutual allegiances and oaths to
justice. Today's selection process requires us to recreate that dialogue
through other means.
12. See J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE (S.B. Chrimes rev. ed. 1986) (1st
ed. 1545). This fifteenth-century work, which was written by Chief Judge Fortescue of the
King's Bench, discussed the constitutional and legal institutions of England. Id. at xliii.
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